Spaces of internal displacement: Understanding the hidden urban geographies of armed conflict in Ukraine

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Abstract

Ukraine, like some other Eastern European post-communist countries, faced a military-political crisis during its subsequent development that led to a ‘new’ category of migrants: internally displaced persons (IDPs). This paper aims to deepen the understanding of the hidden urban geographies of internal displacement and the consequences of armed conflicts in large cities, in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflicts with a focus on major Ukrainian cities as primary recipients of Ukrainian IDPs. The difficulties faced by Ukrainian urban IDPs in adapting to new geopolitical and life realities and integrating into host communities are examined, as well as an elaboration of the spatial intra-urban patterns of IDP distributions. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to achieve the goals of the research. The data set consisted of official data, generalised survey results, and materials from in-depth interviews with urban IDPs from Donbas/Crimea. The empirical results of the study of urban IDPs in Ukraine shed light on patterns of the adaptation and integration of IDPs in large Ukrainian cities and help to understand more deeply the hidden urban geographies of internal displacement in large cities, in particular an understanding of the nature of intra-urban patterns of Ukrainian IDP distributions.

Keywords: forced internal displacement; conflict-affected IDPs; urban IDPs; armed conflict; Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict; Ukraine

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1. Introduction

“Ukraine is facing the biggest displacement crisis in Europe since the Balkan Wars. Over 3.4 million conflict-affected people in Ukraine require humanitarian assistance” (Dr. Thomas Lothar Weiss, International Organization for Migration (IOM); Ukraine’s Chief of Mission, 2018).

More than five years ago, the Revolution of Dignity took place in Ukraine, but in parallel with it, Ukraine faced the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, which is ongoing at present (see Haran et al., 2019; Hauter, 2021; Karasconyi et al., 2014a; Kuzio, 2017; Mykhnenko, 2020; Nitsova, 2021; Yekelchyk, 2015; Zhurzhenko, 2021). These events led to an explosion of mass forced displacement of numerous families from non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs) to the government-controlled areas (GCAs) of Ukraine, and beyond (chiefly Russia and certain EU countries). This paper concerns the internally displaced in Ukraine, with a focus on the geographical patterns of their settlement in government-controlled urban areas.

Globally, the phenomenon of forced internal migration is not something new for the current world community, as it is common in countries with different levels of development, but the push factors of forced internal displacement in countries differ (e.g. climate-induced internally displacement persons (hereinafter IDPs), conflict-induced IDPs, etc.). In less than the last two decades, the number of internally displaced persons in the world has increased more than ten-fold from 4.2 million in at the end of 2003 to 45.7 million in at the end of 2019; simultaneously, the share of this category among forced migrants has approximately tripled (UNHCR, 2004; UNHCR, 2021). In contrast, during this period, the proportion of refugees (including Palestinian refugees under the mandate of The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (hereinafter UNRWA)) among forced migrants declined from two-thirds to one-third, but their absolute number increased from 13.7 million at the end of 2003 to 26 million in at the end of 2019 (ibidem). Despite this growing dynamic trend of IDPs,
“[the] IDPs tend to attract less international attention than refugees who become a political, legal or social policy issue across interstate borders”, according to Gwendolyn Sasse (2020, p. 347).

Moreover, during the last decade (2010–2019), there was a global polarisation reversal in the localisation of IDPs, as at the beginning of the decade, most IDPs lived in rural areas, but at the end of 2018 the ratio between urban and non-urban IDPs was 2:1, i.e. two out of three IDPs live in urban or semi-urban areas (UNHCR, 2021). Nevertheless, a small body of scholarly literature is devoted to the study of urban IDPs, which mainly emphasises the lack of international research attention to the needs of this category of IDPs. Moreover, the World Bank, understanding the unrestrained urbanisation processes in the world, underscores those other approaches that need to be sought to understand IDPs in cities (The World Bank, 2017). In addition, it is important to rethink existing approaches to aid and protection to urban IDPs (Earle et al., 2020), and to shift the focus of the humanitarian response to displacement situations from rural and camp settings to urban areas ( Cotroneo, 2017).

Frequently, IDPs in urban areas face poverty, exploitation, and unemployment, combined with living in overcrowded slums and shantytowns, which are infamous for their unsanitary conditions, high crime rates and lack of access to basic social services (Crisp et al., 2012, p. S25). Many urban IDPs and their needs are ‘invisible’, ‘hidden’, ‘excluded’, and ‘ignored’ by researchers, state and local authorities, and international agencies (e.g. Badescu, 2015; Bradley, 2017; Crisp et al., 2012; Davies and Jacobsen, 2010; Fielden, 2008; Kirbyshire et al., 2017; Montemurro and Walicki, 2010; Orendain and Djlamite, 2021), all of which creates ‘hidden’ urban geographies of internal displacement.

Based on this situation, the main aim of the present study is to deepen understanding of the hidden urban geographies of internal displacement and the consequences of armed conflict in large cities. The paper explores these issues in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict.

2. Theoretical and historical background

Typically, as Nina Birkeland (2009, p. 498) points out, internally displaced persons “disperses within urban areas, in some cases relying on ‘invisibility’ for security reasons, and in others being forced to move again within the city limits by local conflicts and actions of city authorities”.

Additionally, urban areas provide IDPs with access to informal employment opportunities, socialisation (through connections to dense social networks), and humanitarian assistance, which under certain conditions may influence IDPs’ decisions to move to (or within) a city (Khodor and Rigon, 2020). Once in urban areas, however, IDPs often find themselves in peripheral slums with urban poor, who, like them, live in unstable conditions and are socially and economically marginalised (ICRC, 2018; IDMC, 2018). Moreover, the insecurity, informality, and vulnerability of urban IDPs to access basic services and employment can hamper their efforts to reach long-term solutions, and increase their risk of becoming trapped in protracted, repeated or cyclical displacement (IDMC, 2018). Displacement to the capital city of their country is important to improve and stabilise the living conditions of conflict induced IDPs. As Nermin Oruc (2015, pp. 64-65) argues, after studying the experience of urban IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina: “[the] IDPs who decided to move to the capital city are in a much better situation, i.e. they have higher consumption level and are significantly less likely to be poor than the ones who moved to other urban areas”.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has mostly affected about 10 million people (including Crimea) (Karácsényi et al., 2014b). This armed conflict is not unique in the post-Soviet space, however, as the Donbas and Crimea simply expand the list of intermittent or ‘frozen’ conflicts such as the ones in Transnistria (Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), and South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia). Even so, there are dissimilarities in the spatial dimensions and timekeeping of these post-Soviet conflicts.

Altogether, there are two major waves of internal displacement in post-War World II Europe (Cardona- Fox, 2020):

i. The first major wave of internal displacement occurred in the 1990s as a result of armed conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia);

ii. The second major wave of internal displacement took place in the mid-2010s, when Ukraine became the scene of armed conflict as a result of the conflict in breakaway territories of eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation in 2014.

In turn, forced internal displacement in Ukraine also includes several waves. Forced internal displacement began slowly, the first wave, from Crimea starting in March 2014 and the second wave from Donbas, starting in April 2014, and then gradually increased and became massive (Dean, 2017, p. 49). Displacement from the occupied territories has stabilised since 2017, and the number of IDPs officially registered by the Ukrainian authorities remains at about 1.5 million with some fluctuations (IOM, 2019a), with the number of IDPs from Crimea having stabilised within a few months after the annexation, and the number of IDPs from the Donbas having increased steadily during 2014–2015, until stabilising by 2016 (Pozniak, 2017, p. 96). Between 2016 and 2019 there was a decreasing trend the number of registered IDPs due to the return of some of the IDPs to the conflict zone (as a result, they lost their official status of IDPs), and intensified closer control by the social protection authorities according to the criteria for obtaining and prolonging IDP status. Starting from mid-2019 and until mid-2020, however, an increase in the number of IDPs was registered by almost 5% or more than 65 thousand people, due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (in March 2020) in Ukraine. In addition, one sees in the world and its crisis consequences for the socio-economic and political situation of numerous countries, the return of IDP-workers from abroad and stimulated marginalisation among vulnerable categories of Ukrainian IDPs (Havrylyuk and Pozniak, 2020, pp. 86–87).

The majority of Ukrainian IDPs, like the majority of European IDPs, originate from and live in urban settings, which is not unexpected, as most European countries (including Ukraine) are highly urbanised (Cardona- Fox, 2020; Libanova, 2014; Walicki, 2009). Typically, IDPs in Europe are discriminated and marginalised and tend to settle in disadvantaged urban settings, which are inherent in the periphery of urban centres. Moreover, IDPs are often traumatised by the fact that they have witnessed war, lost their homes and family members, and faced the daily life challenges of IDPs, such as poor housing conditions
and emotional stress which negatively affect their health (Cardona-Fox, 2020; Gogishvili, 2015; Gureyeva-Aliyeva and Huseynov, 2011; Montemurro and Walicki, 2010). Internally displaced persons adapt to new geopolitical and life realities in different ways, as their ability to adapt depends on their experience, gender, ethnic and cultural background, economic situation, and social networks before and after their displacement (IDMC, 2019).

Considering the above, we may hypothesise the existence of a ‘poor neighbourhood effect’ (van Kempen and Wissink, 2014) and ‘high housing cost effect’, as most IDPs in conflict-affected countries cannot afford to live in good and comfortable urban neighbourhoods with expensive housing, which impact the spatial distribution of IDPs in a city.

In fact, according to the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP) of Ukraine, as of 13.06.2019, 1,385,062 persons were officially registered as internally displaced. MSP registers persons who have applied for the payment of their right pensions or social benefits at the new place of residence, so it is appropriate to emphasise that the actual registration of MSP covers not only displaced persons, but also those who de facto live in NGCAs, because they do not have opportunities to rent housing in GCAs or did not want to leave their own housing in the occupied part of Ukraine (Ivashchenko-Stadnik, 2017, p. 28). Simultaneously, IDPs from NGCAs periodically come to receive pensions or social benefits in GCAs (Smal and Pozniak, 2016, p. 9): this phenomenon is better known as ‘pension tourism/social benefits tourism’ (Bulakh, 2020; Kuznetsova and Mikheieva, 2020, p. 699; Smal and Pozniak, 2016, p. 9) or ‘shuttling IDPs’ (Ivashchenko-Stadnik, 2017, p. 28).

On the one hand, ‘shuttling IDPs’ move back and forth without trying to integrate into a new community, and before a stricter payment control system was launched. Many of the ‘shuttling IDPs’ used their ambivalent status of ‘being-here-and-there’ to double social payments, as most IDPs in conflict-affected countries cannot afford to live in good and comfortable urban neighbourhoods with expensive housing, which impact the spatial distribution of IDPs in a city.

On the other hand, strict control over social benefits for ‘shuttling IDPs’ and their stigmatisation in Ukrainian society as ‘pension tourists’ and ‘social benefits tourists’ (Kuznetsova and Mikheieva, 2020, p. 699) – these are derogatory terms for approximately 0.5 million people who periodically cross the line of contact between GCAs and NGCAs, better known as the 427-kilometre Line of Contact (Wetterwald and Thaller, 2020, p. 23) – ignore the reality that for many retirees from NGCAs, payments from the Ukrainian state are their only source of income and that they have the full right, as citizens of Ukraine, to receive their pension (Bulakh, 2020). The loss of these payments can trigger socio-economic marginalisation of civilians on the other side of the armed conflict (i.e. NGCAs). Most people who crossed the 427-kilometre Line of Contact in 2019 were residents of NGCAs and were predominantly elderly (60+), as residents of NGCAs often need services (especially pensions and social benefits) that are unavailable or limited in NGCAs (CBRTF and UNHCR, 2020). Moreover, the stigma of ‘pension tourists’ or ‘social benefits tourists’, which is widely diffused through the Ukrainian media, reinforces the negative image of people with official IDP status (including those living in NGCAs) and hinders processes of social cohesion and reconciliation (Kuznetsova, 2017, p. 14; Kuznetsova and Mikheieva, 2020, p. 699).

Unfortunately, among Ukrainian IDPs, there is a group who refuse or cannot register their IDP status, which increases the risk of being socially vulnerable and restricted in their rights. Usually, those who do not register are those who do not have documents (as is the case with displaced Roma people) or are unable to pay taxes, have concerns about the difficult and incomprehensible registration process (bureaucratic obstacles), or are afraid of conscription, or do not need government assistance (Dean, 2017, p. 50; IOM, 2017). Non-registration of IDP status is widespread among young Ukrainian IDPs (youth employed) who do not want to spend time on lengthy bureaucratic procedures, but simply seek to live in GCAs without wanting to return, even at the end of armed conflict (Ivashchenko-Stadnik, 2017, p. 28). Additionally, Ukrainian IDPs have difficulty registering marriages, births, and deaths in the face of lost or damaged identifications (Uehling, 2020). Summing up, Ukrainian IDPs who do not have official IDP status but live in GCAs, in combination with those who have official IDP status but de facto live within NGCAs, form a special category called ‘hybrid IDPs’ (Ivashchenko-Stadnik, 2017, p. 28), which is the result and marker of current socio-political perturbations in Ukraine.

Returning to the number of IDPs reported by MSP in mid-2019, a majority moved from their previous residences located in Donetsk (60%) and Luhansk (37%) oblasts, a minority or arithmetically speaking only 3% moved from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, while one-half of registered IDPs permanently reside in GCAs of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, beyond the 20 km area along the contact line (IOM, 2019b). Although IDPs from Crimea amount to about 3% of Ukrainian IDPs, this figure is clearly underestimated, since the majority of Crimean IDPs are Crimean Tatars, who are less inclined to register their IDP status officially (Uehling, 2020).

According to the UN agencies in Ukraine, IDPs state that housing is their main priority. Moreover, many IDPs insist that permanent housing, especially in combination with a steady income and job, is the key and prerequisite for successful integration, as it will allow for social ties and stable employment/private enterprise (IOM, 2019b; IOM, 2020; UNHCR, 2019). In general, there are no regional restrictions or differences in affordable housing, but there are social and economic factors, such as income, household size, and work, thereby many IDPs simply cannot afford to move to Kyiv with its expensive residential real estate.

In addition, IDP social benefits are not enough to pay rent almost anywhere in Ukraine (Kuznetsova, 2017, p. 4). It should not be forgotten that most landlords add to the rent for accommodation another payment for utilities (gas, water, electricity, etc.), which further aggravates the socio-economic situation of IDP households: this is another argument that illustrates the importance of the above-mentioned ‘high housing cost effect’, which forces multiple housing mobility of IDPs within a city and reduces their chances of successful integration into urban host communities.

According to the National Monitoring System (hereinafter NMS) by International Organization for Migration (hereinafter IOM), as of June 2019, a large majority of IDPs (91%) owned housing before displacement, and 86% reported that they had official documents confirming their ownership. Also, at the time of monitoring, 19% of IDPs noted that their homes were damaged (12%) or destroyed (7%), and about 70% knew that their homes were not affected by the armed conflict (IOM, 2019b). The most common problem for Ukrainian IDPs is the lack of their own housing; as of June 2019, many IDPs continue to...
live in rented accommodation (a trend that has persisted since the beginning of the NMS in 2016 (IOM, 2017; IOM, 2019b)): 49% live in rented apartments, 10% in rented houses, and only 5% in rented rooms. In contrast, 12% of IDPs live in their own homes, which is 3% more than in June 2017, about 2% of IDPs live in collective centres (see Fig. 1), and the rest lives in other types of accommodation (e.g. host family/relatives, dormitory, etc.) (IOM, 2019b).

According to the Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons of Ukraine, as of January 1, 2019, there were 161 collective centres in Ukraine (e.g. temporary settlements such as camps, dormitories, hotels, etc.), where about 7.7 thousand IDPs lived, but a total of 10,510 places in these collective centres. Most collective centres are located in Donetsk (39 collective centres), Dnipropetrovsk (34), Zaporizhzhia (15), Kharkiv (12), and Kyiv (10) oblasts and Kyiv (9); in contrast, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, and Cherkasy oblasts have no collective centres. In addition, there are at least two cases of unauthorised places of contact residence (collective centres) in Ukraine, in which IDPs have arbitrarily occupied buildings, namely at 4 Uspenska Street (Odesa) and in Fontanka (Odesa oblast) (CFRTP and UNHCR, 2019).

The majority of Ukrainian IDPs report renting housing informally, i.e. without any contract or other documents. In addition, the IDPs' economic situation is hampered by the need to pay rent, with about a quarter of IDP tenants at risk of being evicted due to inability to pay rent (IOM, 2020). It is this tense housing situation and family ties that have been the main reasons for returning to NGCAs, and these reasons remain unchanged throughout all rounds of national monitoring (NMS) (ibidem).

As highlighted by previous studies of Ukrainian IDPs (e.g. Bulakh, 2017; IOM, 2019b; Krakhmalova, 2019; Smal and Pozniak, 2016; UNHCR, 2019), IDPs face various types of discrimination, which can lead to their marginalisation and fuel their intentions to return to NGCAs. Numerous IDPs have experienced discrimination and unfair treatment, mainly in health care, employment, housing, and in interactions with host community populations (IOM, 2019b). The real estate market and the labour market were and are especially important spheres for IDPs in their social integration, but it was in these spheres that a negative image of displaced persons was produced in the first years of the armed conflict (Bulakh, 2017, p. 54). Both markets began to openly filter out IDPs from potential contacts and the beneficiaries using the ‘displacement/displaced people’ marker in advertisement rubrics (ibidem). For example, based on data from oxl.ua (cited in Bulakh, 2017, p. 54), in the spring of 2015 more than half of the ads for long-term rental apartments with reasonable prices in Kyiv had certain notes on ‘displaced people and brokers, please do not disturb’ or in some cases ‘displaced people might be considered’.

Also, IDPs faced biased attitudes in the process of applying for pensions and social benefits. Less common are cases of discrimination in contacting state authorities or law enforcement agencies, but this relative rarity may be due to a banal lack of experience in applying to such authorities among most IDPs (Smal and Pozniak, 2016, p. 22). Furthermore, Ukrainian IDPs experienced discrimination against their voting rights in municipal elections – or as this phenomenon has been called ‘freezing’ Ukrainian IDPs’ voting (electoral) rights (Krakhmalova, 2019) – which lasted more than five years and contradicted their electoral rights and freedoms as citizens of Ukraine. Only relatively recently, in 2020, the voting rights of IDPs have been ‘unfrozen’ in the local elections of host communities (CFRTP, 2020; COE, 2020).

Thus, stigmatisation, discrimination, unsatisfactory living conditions and the routine life of Ukrainian IDPs in the realities of the ongoing armed conflict affect the health of IDPs. As the results of the first representative nation-wide survey of Ukrainian IDPs on their mental health show, three-quarters of adult IDPs need psychological assistance, but for various reasons did not receive it, due to ignorance of the need for treatment, self-treatment, high cost of treatment and medication, or the low quality of the care available (Roberts et al., 2019, p. 109). The literature on the socio-economic predicament of IDPs in Ukraine typically examines the issue at a national/subnational (i.e. macro-scale) or regional scale.

At the macro-scale, scholars have studied changes in the living conditions of IDPs (housing and safety of living) during the years of armed conflict (e.g. Hnatyuk, 2020), issues of social adaptation and integration into host communities (e.g. Niemets et al., 2020), and socio-economic inequalities and discrimination against IDPs (e.g. Novikova and Shamileva, 2019). In recent years there has been an improvement in the living conditions of Ukrainian IDPs compared to the first years of the armed conflict, such as the inclusion of IDPs into the state lending programs for home purchase, and an increase in the share of the IDPs living in their own housing. At present, the IDPs highly value the quality of living conditions and the level of security of the living environment (Hnatyuk, 2020).
At the regional scale, researchers have studied IDPs’ discrimination issues (e.g. Vakhitova and Iavorsky, 2020), IDPs’ access to housing and good living conditions (e.g. Hnatyuk, 2016; NRC, 2016), and barriers to socio-economic integration and adaptation of IDPs to new geopolitical and life realities (e.g. IOM, 2016; Lohvynova, 2020). Also, the studies covered the impact of mass IDP flows on the socio-economic development of Ukrainian regions (e.g. Arakelova, 2017), as well as reasons why some regions of the country were more attractive for displaced people than others (e.g. Brenzel et al., 2015). As emphasised by Arakelova (2017), regions that have suffered serious socio-economic consequences due to the high concentration of IDPs are confined to the zone of armed conflict (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and as an exception – the capital of Ukraine – Kyiv). Inter alia, these regions have not adapted their regional policies to effectively address the most pressing IDP issues in various aspects of their socio-economic life, which is hampering the integration of IDPs in the above-mentioned regions. Furthermore, in the first years of the military conflict, IDPs mostly moved to relatively prosperous regions of Ukraine with comparatively good working labour markets (Brenzel et al., 2015).

From the literature reviewed, it seems that the site of the everyday lives of the Ukrainian IDPs – the local and especially urban level – has been subject to very little scholarly work, although in Ukraine, as in other countries of post-communist armed conflicts (e.g. Georgia, Azerbaijan), urban communities are frequently the main recipients and final destinations of IDPs, where their further adaptation and integration takes place. Typically, IDPs concentrated in the capital and other major cities of their country, for example, Georgia (Mitchneck et al., 2009), Azerbaijan (Gureyeva-Aliyeva and Huseynov, 2011), and Ukraine is no exception (Libanova, 2014). Naturally, Ukrainian IDPs are more attracted to large cities, where it is usually easier to find accommodation and jobs – Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Odesa (Libanova, 2014, p. 16).

Roughly speaking, the main flows of internal displacement almost duplicate the main flows of internal migration in Ukraine, with respect to key recipient regions and recipient cities, as traditionally Kyiv has a positive migration balance of internal migration, as well as regions with the major Ukrainian cities – Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv. Such movements are likely due to the location of leading educational institutions, which attracts young people to them; in addition, there is a favourable situation in the labour market (i.e. there is a demand for labour and high wages) (IOM, 2019a). In contrast, IDPs are least satisfied with the prospects of living in rural areas, which is understandable given that the lion’s share of IDPs are urban residents (Libanova, 2014, pp. 16–17): most of them lived before the armed conflict in highly urbanised areas such as the Donetsk conurbation (Mykhnenko et al., 2010) and other smaller urban agglomerations in Donbas (Rechłowicz and Tkocz, 2013), which during the armed conflict were and still are undergoing a devastating military urbicide (Slyvka and Zakutynska, 2016). Undoubtedly, the local urban scale is very important for understanding the current socio-economic situation of Ukrainian IDPs, as policymakers need to understand the constructive levers of improving IDP integration in host communities, and to slow down the process of returning IDPs to their places of origin in NGCAs.

Based on these previous studies, Ukrainian urban IDPs are an ignored topic in scholarly studies. This is not uncommon: urban IDPs, as Anne Davies and Karen Jacobsen (2010, p. 13) emphasise, “comprise a hidden population, and aid agencies and governments have difficulty identifying them and understanding their experiences relative to the host population amongst whom they live”. Moreover, “[l]ittle is known about their demographics, basic needs and protection problems, yet they are believed to be among the poorest and most vulnerable groups in many conflict-affected countries”.

Concerning the latter, such socio-economic inequalities between IDPs and non-IDPs may lead to the spatial and social isolation of IDPs in the cities of conflict-affected countries (e.g. Georgia (see Gogishvili, 2015; Gogishvili and Harris-Brandts, 2019; Salukvadze et al., 2014)). This prompts the expression of a hypothesis about the effect of IDP segregation/isolation.

The present study opens new directions for research not anticipated by previous studies of Ukrainian IDPs’ socio-economic conditions. In addition, the current paper aims to rectify lacuna in the study of IDPs that live in Ukrainian urban settings.

Accordingly, the following research questions were formulated:

- What spatial patterns of IDP distribution are observed in the major Ukrainian cities as the main recipients of IDPs?
- To what extent does the spatial localisation/concentration of IDPs in different major Ukrainian cities depend on the key characteristics of the residential environment of urban districts that are important for the adaptation and integration of IDPs?
- What problems have IDPs most often faced and continue to face during their integration into the host communities of major Ukrainian cities?

The working hypotheses based on the reviewed literature are as follows:

- Hypothesis 1 (‘poor neighbourhood effect’): the lower the level of the comfort of the urban district – the higher the probability of spatial concentration/localisation of IDPs;
- Hypothesis 2 (‘high housing cost effect’): the higher the cost of housing within an urban district, the less likely there is a concentration/localisation of IDPs; and
- Hypothesis 3 (‘segregation effect’): an essential spatial isolation (enclavisation) of IDPs is observed in major Ukrainian cities.

3. Data and methods

The major cities in Ukraine are Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk (before the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine), Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk (until 2016 Dnipropetrovsk) and Lviv (Mezentsev, 2005; Rudenko and Savchuk, 2013): see Figure 2. These are the cities that have become the main recipients of forced internal displacement flows from Donbas and Crimea to the macro-regions of which they are the centres. Thus, according to MSP, as of June 13, 2019, 61% of all IDPs in the Kyiv (or capital) macro-region are concentrated in Kyiv, similarly, 52% in Kharkiv, 48% in Odesa, 24% in Dnipropetrovsk and 20% in Lviv.

The first component of the empirical data set is the official state statistics (Ministry of Social Policy and State Statistics Service of Ukraine): the registered number of internally displaced persons and the average annual population in
different urban districts of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, and Lviv. This study also used the results of surveys of urban residents on their assessment of the comfort of their residential environment (on a 5-point Likert scale) on the criteria of safety, cleanliness, infrastructure, transport accessibility, and quality of life in administrative districts of cities: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro and Lviv (commissioned by the international company “OLX” (see OLX, 2019a–OLX, 2019e). In total, in January 2019, some 38 thousand respondents were interviewed in these cities. Specifically, more than 15.5 thousand people in Kyiv, 7 thousand people in Kharkiv, more than 5.5 thousand people in Odesa, more than 5 and 4.5 thousand people in Dnipro and Lviv, respectively. Another source of data is weekly data on the value of residential real estate in various urban districts of the afore-mentioned cities for all months of 2018, which are publicly available on the official website of the company “DOMIK.UA”.

And the last component of the empirical data set for this study is the materials of in-depth interviews conducted (during Autumn 2020–Spring 2021) by the author with IDPs from Donbas/Crimea, living in GCAs in some major cities, including Greater Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk-Dniprodzerzhynsk), Odesa and Kharkiv (for more details see Appendix 1). The purpose of the in-depth interviews was to scrutinise the life stories of urban IDPs and their current living and housing conditions, employment, state support, relations with the host community population, etc., and how this has changed over the years of armed conflict. The nonprobability sampling technique (i.e. reputational or snowball sampling) was chosen as the principal method of selecting informants, because IDPs often do not specify their status in social networks or life, or even hide it from non-IDPs. The informants’ responses were recorded by hand and then transcribed in fully anonymised form. Further analysis of the results of the interviews was conducted using separate thematic blocks (such as IDP life stories; living and housing conditions; psychological consequences of armed conflict and sense of security, etc.).

The following indicators of IDP distribution and key characteristics of the urban districts’ residential environment of the major Ukrainian cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, and Lviv) were used in the present study:

- Rating of administrative districts of cities by the level of residential environment comfort (OLX survey in January 2019);
- [Share of] Registered number of IDPs in an urban district ([%] persons, as of June 13, 2019);
- [Share of] Average annual population in an urban district ([%] persons, in 2018);
- Index of IDP concentration in an urban district (number of internally displaced persons per 1,000 urban residents);
- Index of IDP localisation in an urban district (relative ratio of the spatial distribution of internally displaced persons to the spatial distribution of local residents within the city):

\[ IL_{ij} = \frac{P_{ij}}{P_{j}} \cdot \frac{C_{ij}}{C_{j}} \]

where \( IL_{ij} \) is IDP localisation index in the \( i \)-th district of the \( j \)-th major city of Ukraine; \( P_{ij} \) is the number of IDPs in the \( i \)-th district of the \( j \)-th city as of June 13, 2019; \( P_{j} \) is the number of IDPs in the \( j \)-th city as of June 13, 2019; \( C_{ij} \) is average annual population in the \( i \)-th district of the \( j \)-th city in 2018; \( C_{j} \) is average annual population in the \( j \)-th city in 2018; and

- Average annual cost of housing – the cost of apartments – in an urban district (USD/m², 2018). In the case of Odesa, the average annual cost of housing was calculated as the weighted arithmetic mean of the population weighted by the population of the districts according to the 2001 census following to the formula:

\[ \bar{p} = \frac{w_1 p_1 + w_2 p_2 + \cdots + w_n p_n}{w_1 + w_2 + \cdots + w_n} \]
where $w_i = \text{weights calculated by population}$; $p_i = \text{average annual cost of housing}$. This technique is used because statistical information on the price of residential real estate is available only in terms of the old administrative districts of Odesa, which were merged or divided and formed the current administrative districts of Odesa from January 1, 2003. It is important to emphasise that this is a generalised estimate of the average annual cost of housing in urban districts of Odesa in 2018.

Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to answer the research questions. Quantitative methods included normalisation, Pearson’s correlation, cluster analysis and others that were used to analyse indicators of the distribution of IDPs and key characteristics of the residential environment of urban districts in major Ukrainian cities. Correlation analysis was used to confirm or refute the first two hypotheses (‘poor neighbourhood effect’ and ‘high housing cost effect’). The technique of cluster analysis was chosen to confirm/refute the last hypothesis (‘segregation effect’), as it is widely used in forced migration studies (e.g. Al-Temimi et al., 2018; de Hoon et al., 2021; Koning, 2019). Some qualitative methods included materials from in-depth interviews, which were analysed to better understand the everyday life of IDPs and their problems of adaptation and integration, as well as to clarify the results obtained using the quantitative methods. As for cluster analysis, to achieve uni-dimensionality and comparability of indicators, a normalisation technique (Wilkozas-Mamaczycz et al., 2020) was used for all indicators except the IDP localisation index. The technique or method of normalisation of the indicator in this study is as follows:

$$Z_i = \frac{x_i}{\bar{x}}$$

where: $x_i = \text{the value of a particular indicator in the } i\text{-th district in a designated major city of Ukraine}$; and $\bar{x} = \text{the average value of the particular indicator in the designated city}$.

The main limitations of the present study are, to a certain extent, the discrepancy between the comparison of some available statistical data between different urban districts of major cities: in particular, this concerns the size of the districts by their population (see Appendix 2). To minimise the ‘shuttling IDPs’ effect, we study only IDPs living in major Ukrainian cities.

4. Results and discussion

4.1 IDP distribution and urban district residential environments

The results of the correlation analysis show that the intra-urban patterns of IDP distribution within the five major cities of Ukraine are different depending on the distance of the city from the conflict zone, the size of urban districts, population density, etc. (see Tab. 1). In particular, in Kharkiv, the localisation/concentration of IDPs is directly related to the level of residential environment comfort of an urban district ($r = 0.85$) and the prestige and cost of its housing ($r = 0.81$). The situation is almost similar in Dnipropetrovsk, where the spatial distribution of IDPs is strongly related to the level of residential environment comfort of the urban district ($r = 0.94$), and the cost of residential real estate plays a much smaller role ($r = 0.78$). In contrast to the two above-mentioned cities, in the case of Odesa, there is an ‘absolute’ positive correlation between the level of residential environment comfort of the district and the localisation/concentration of IDPs ($r = 1.00$), and the correlation between the latter and the cost of housing is moderate ($r = 0.64$), but statistically insignificant ($p$-level more than 0.1).

On the other hand, it is not surprising that the spatial pattern of IDP distribution in Kyiv does not directly depend on the cost of housing, and only slightly on the comfort of districts’ residential environment ($r = 0.62$): the capital status of the city forms its specific conditions for integration and adaptation of IDPs in urban district host communities, which is due to a large segment of luxury housing in the central parts of the city and a fairly high level of landscaping, good transport links, etc., which is not common and not so significant in other regional centres of Ukraine. In the last major city of Lviv, most distant from the conflict zone, there is a moderate inverse correlation between the level of localisation/concentration of IDPs and the level of residential environment comfort of the districts ($r = -0.55$), but this relationship is statistically insignificant, which is obviously due to the low polarisation of the comfort of urban districts in Lviv, rather than the desire of IDPs to live in districts with worse residential environment conditions. In addition, in Lviv, it was not possible to find a significant correlation between the spatial distribution of IDPs and the cost of housing in the intra-urban dimension.

Thus, the positive correlation between the localisation/concentration of IDPs and the level of residential environment comfort of the district is confirmed only in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa and with a less statistically significant and weaker level of correlation in Kyiv. Lviv is an exception to this socio-spatial pattern: firstly, due to the small number of registered IDPs through its remoteness from the conflict zone; secondly, due to the relatively low polarisation of the comfort of district residential environments within the city (see Appendix 2). Furthermore, a positive correlation between the localisation/concentration of IDPs and the cost of housing is observed only in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. In the case of the other major cities, there is either a statistically insignificant relationship, or its complete absence due to the peculiarities of the housing markets of these cities.

Considering the above empirical results, hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 were not confirmed in the major cities of Ukraine; on the contrary, the ‘poor neighbourhood effect’ and ‘high housing cost effect’ had a reverse relationship with the localisation/concentration of IDPs in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, and according to the first effect in Odesa and Kyiv. Moreover, there is a high possibility that the farther away from the conflict zone, the less the probability of significant correlations with the localisation/concentration of IDPs from the above indicators – as a result of a decrease in the number of registered IDPs with remoteness from the conflict zone, or as a result of the impact set of specific factors (features of the housing market, the specifics of the administrative-territorial division of the city, capital status, etc.).

4.2 Spatial differentiation of IDPs in major Ukrainian cities

According to cluster analysis results, nine clusters are distinguished (see Fig. 3), which have their own features in the spatial differentiation of IDPs, but which can be generalised into the following four types (see Fig. 4).
### Variables

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**Tab. 1: Concentration-localisation of IDPs: Relationships between IDP distribution and residential environments of the major Ukrainian cities.**

**Notes:** 1. Correlations are significant ***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; 2. Variables: (1) Share of registered number of IDPs (%), as of June 13, 2019; (2) Index of IDP concentration (number of IDPs per 1,000 urban residents); (3) Index of IDP localisation; (4) Average annual population in urban districts (persons, 2018); (5) The level of residential environment comfort in urban districts (OLX survey in January 2019); (6) Average annual cost of housing – the cost of apartments – in urban districts (USD/m², 2018)

**Source:** author’s elaboration

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**Fig. 3: Cluster analysis results**

**Source:** author’s elaboration
Type 1: urban districts with conspicuous localisation of IDPs

The first type includes 13 urban districts, characterised by a conspicuous localisation of IDPs and a very high spatial concentration of IDPs. Type 1 consists of two subtypes. Most urban districts of this type have a comfortable and quite expensive and prestigious residential environment – Subtype 1.1 (see Appendix 3). Almost every tenth IDP in Lviv and Kyiv, every third IDP in the Dnipro and Odesa, and ca. 40% of IDPs in Kharkiv live in the urban districts of Subtype 1.1.

Although another six districts of the major Ukrainian cities, members of Subtype 1.2, have a high level of residential environment comfort, they are not very expensive within their cities, and therefore more accessible to middle-income IDP households. It was very important for IDPs who sought to settle in Kyiv, where the capital’s labour market has a good conjuncture, and housing prices in almost all urban districts are high compared to the central and prestigious districts of other major Ukrainian cities. In Kyiv about half of IDPs live in districts of Subtype 1.2. In Odesa, every fourth IDP, in Lviv, every second IDP, lives in an urban district that is part of Subtype 1.2.

Type 2: urban districts with ‘moderate’ localisation of IDPs

Type 2 consists of two subtypes, which combine 11 urban districts with ‘moderate’ IDP localisation and mostly middle-level concentration of IDPs. As a rule, urban districts of this type have a comfortable residential environment, but the affordability of these residential and housing conditions differs from district to district. For example, Subtype 2.1 includes urban districts with a satisfactory comfortable
residential environment and relatively expensive housing. These districts are residential places for 11%, 13%, and 16% of IDPs in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Lviv, respectively, as well as every third IDP in Kharkiv. Subtype 2.2 consists of five urban districts, most of which have second-rate comfort of the residential environment and a more affordable and cheaper housing market than other districts in the previous subtype. In these districts, where an average spatial concentration of IDPs prevails, 41% of all IDPs in Dnipro live there, i.e. almost every second IDP in Dnipro, one quarter of IDPs in Odessa, and 9% of IDPs in Kharkiv. In general, IDP households with middle and lower middle income levels can afford to live in urban districts with ‘moderate’ localisation of IDPs.

Type 3: urban districts with ‘tangible presence’ of IDPs

Type 3 consists of 12 urban districts where there is a rather weak but ‘tangible presence’ of IDPs. This type is formed by Subtype 3.1 and Subtype 3.2, which combine urban districts with a predominance of poorly comfortable residential environments, and the difference between the two subtypes is the different degrees of spatial concentration of IDPs and housing affordability. Subtype 3.1 consists of districts with a low level of spatial IDP concentration and a supply of housing in the mid-price category (in their cities). Roughly speaking, every tenth IDP in the Dnipro, Kyiv and Kharkiv lives in these districts, as well as every seventh IDP in Lviv. In contrast, Subtype 3.2 integrates urban districts that generally have very low IDP concentration and housing supply in a relatively cheap and inexpensively price category (within their cities). Living in such urban districts is the least acceptable option for the lower strata of Ukrainian IDPs. Almost a quarter of IDPs in Kyiv, 16% of IDPs in Odessa, 13% of IDPs in Lviv, 7% of IDPs in Kharkiv, and only 4% of IDPs in Dnipro live in such districts.

Type 4: urban district with a high dispersion of IDPs

Type 4 includes only one Pecherskyi District (Kyiv), which has a high dispersion of IDPs. This district is positioned as a luxury district for wealthy people with prohibitively expensive housing, so ordinary IDPs cannot afford housing here. Therefore, only the upper echelons of Ukrainian IDPs can afford to live in Pecherskyi District. Contrary to the luxury status of this district, it has a relatively comfortable residential environment because it is ‘central city’ with all the positive and negative effects in its territory, such as total commercialisation and other neoliberal urban transformations. This district has the lowest level of IDP localisation and concentration, and only about 3% of IDPs in Kyiv live there.

In summing up, the general intra-urban pattern of IDP distribution within the identified types of urban districts is as follows. The majority of urban IDPs live in comfortable urban districts in terms of security, cleanliness, and infrastructure provision, but with different housing prices. The minority lives in either uncomfortable or luxurious urban districts.

4.3 Social situation of urban IDPs in Ukraine: Still internally displaced persons or already local citizens?

We now turn to the more qualitative results of the research.

4.3.1 The impact of ongoing armed conflict on IDPs’ psychological well-being. Adaptation to new realities and barriers to integration into host urban communities

Most informants say that what they experienced because of the armed conflict is: “a new stage of life” (IDP1); “really a tragedy” (IDP2); “It is completely tragic, I will not say. There were a million difficulties” (IDP3); “a vital event for me. It changed me a lot” (IDP4); “it was a difficult period” (IDP5), and the like. About other displaced people, it is stated that “For many, such a transformation, a phase change, was a tough way of changing life” (IDP3), confirmed by the following responses:

“I would like to decide for myself – where is our place, where to stay. The most was the tragedy – everything was quit...” (IDP2)

“My life has changed. I was a successful entrepreneur. An apartment in the city centre. [...] We did not think that the war would continue so long. We thought that everything would be resolved faster. Here, life changed from an entrepreneur to a displaced person on social benefit...” (IDP6)

“Of course [life trauma – author’s remark]. Leaving home for two weeks and not returning there” (IDP7)

Moreover, the armed conflict in Ukraine has affected the ‘usual’ lifestyle of the participants: some of them note that in addition to changing living conditions, their social circle has narrowed, as an example:

“We do not allow [people] into [our] personal space. [...] After I displaced, we are nowhere to be found on the social network. We deleted all profiles. It’s just dangerous” (IDP2).

The IDPs note that volunteers (including local activists), charitable local/international foundations, and organisations have helped them a lot to survive the stress of the military-political conflict and adapt to the new geopolitical and life realities in GCAs. Local authorities provided much less assistance to IDPs, while assistance and support from the state were ‘invisible’. Participants from Crimea/Donbas noted:

“I shall say the help was from people. Not from the state. Activists came and arranged it. I am grateful. The stress that the child went through in [one of Crimean cities], thanks to the help of Dnipropetrovsk’s residents, quickly passed. [...] If it were not for the volunteers, I do not know where we would be. We would become real homeless people. Only thanks to the volunteers, thanks to the organisation, we were able to live out” (IDP4);

“At first, [volunteers] helped everyone – household items, clothes, spoons, mugs. [We] took dishes, winter clothes. Products. This was the first year. Now everything has stopped. There was also the Akhmetov Foundation. For seven months [the fund was providing humanitarian aid], but then it didn’t work out” (IDP8).

Presently, IDPs say that compared to the first years of the armed conflict, the aid of volunteers and various charitable organisations has become smaller, which is apparently due to the reduction of urgent needs among IDPs in terms of clothing, food, shoes, blankets, etc. As well, some IDPs deliberately refused social assistance for different individual reasons. The most important current financial support for urban IDPs is governmental targetted social benefits: realistically speaking, their size is so small that it cannot even cover utility bills for an apartment, let alone the cost of a rented apartment. Furthermore, those IDPs who have housing in NGCAs must pay utility bills to the occupation authorities, because otherwise their houses and apartments are confiscated. This has a serious impact on the socio-economic situation of IDP households. In legal terms, to get governmental social benefits, IDPs must be registered and periodically confirm and extend their status. Most
informants emphasised that they did not have appreciable legal problems with obtaining IDP status, but often had bureaucratic problems with prolongation or re-registration, especially due to long queues and the arrival of social workers at IDPs’ places of registration (i.e. place of residence) when they were at work.

Such experiences in GCAs, however, differ from city to city because the more IDPs are registered in a city or urban district, the longer queues in which IDPs need to stand. IDPs also report that bureaucratic problems have disappeared with the start of quarantine in Ukraine due to the global pandemic of coronavirus. Regarding the above, it is interesting that one of the urban IDPs said the following: “We have [the IDP] certificate. Perpetual. It hurts me. This kills the last hope that someday we will return” (IDP5). In addition, employment problems are another barrier to the integration of IDPs in the major cities. Describing the opportunities in the labour market of their cities, IDPs mentioned that:

“Labour market in Kharkiv – the level of income and wages is lower than it was in Donetsk...” (IDP1);

“At first it was difficult. Especially to my husband. [...] The wage is lower, the conditions are different [than in a typical mid-city of Donetsk oblast]. Not entirely pleasant, [the employers] have been a lot of scams, framing” (IDP5);

“[It] is possible to find [a job]. Not always by education. Now, there are more marketing professions” (IDP7).

Moreover, through the coronavirus pandemic, the financial situation of some IDPs has been seriously deteriorating, as evidenced by the following responses:

“It is difficult for him [her husband] with work. He is in the construction industry. Quarantine is difficult. Construction has stopped, [the employers] are not paying...” (IDP6);

“How do our [IDPs] solve the problem with [a job]? Trade sphere. Although the coronavirus has created a problem [in this] too” (IDP3).

Also, in selected major Ukrainian cities, the social stigmatisation of IDPs is observed and the associated further discrimination leads to marginalisation of IDPs and prevents them from adapting to new realities and creates many barriers for them to integrate into the host communities. Most urban IDPs report that either they, their family members, or IDP acquaintances have faced social stigmatisation or discrimination in rent, employment opportunities, medical and educational services, housing conditions, etc. As examples:

“You know, in 2014, it was hard. Numerous displaced persons were deceiving. I had to cope. It was more difficult to rent an accommodation. But you never know; they [IDPs] will leave an apartment, take something away, leave, then you will not find them there [NGCAs]” (IDP7);

“What amazes me is that the nurse calls the chief doctor and says: what are we doing with such people? The stigma of a special person. In Kharkiv, ‘displaced person’ is written in red on the medical card. As the stars [the Star of David] used to be for the Jews. They sculp to us with the red colour ‘displaced person’” (IDP8).

Participants do point out, however, that the peak of these negative phenomena occurred in the first years of the armed conflict, and in the following years they note a certain decline and normalisation. A representative quote, for example, would be:

“Now people have become more enlightened. The war has affected more than half of the people in Ukraine” (IDP6).

Speaking of the residents’ attitudes to displaced people, it varies from city to city, but in general, there is a tendency that the farther from the conflict zone and the smaller the city, the more negative the attitude to IDPs. This is mainly since, as a rule, the labour markets of the small and medium-sized cities of Ukraine, especially provincial ones, are highly depressed: therefore, the rapid flow of IDPs to these categories of cities exacerbated the already deeply depressed labour market, which led to the spread of various manifestations of social stigmatisation and created in the early years of the conflict, many barriers to the adaptation of IDPs to new realities and hindered integration. In contrast, in the major cities of Ukraine, people are accustomed to competition and constant staff turnover in the labour market, and frequent changes in market conjuncture. For example, IDPs from Kharkiv, referring to the local attitudes to them, reported that:

“The attitude is the same as to Kharkiv citizens” (IDP1);


In the case of Odessa, informants note that there are some conflicts related to the burden on the city’s social infrastructure, but

“mostly people have a very good [attitude to IDPs]. But all the same Odessa [consists of migrants]. We [locals] are indigenous – but also grandchildren-great-grandchildren of those who came in large numbers” (IDP3).

Finally, in Greater Dnipro, the responses of the informants differ only slightly from each other, apparently depending on the presence or absence of experience of living in an IDP camp. For example, those who have no experience of living in an IDP camp emphasise that:

“In general, the attitude of the locals to the IDPs is benevolent. [...] At the moment it has improved. Everyone has adapted. People have arrived and have lived for more than one year” (IDP7);

“How are relationships different [local to IDPs in different host communities]? The same. Smooth. There are no more any [incidents]. I drove around in a car with Donetsk license plates. But there were no threats or provocations” (IDP2);

and those who previously lived in an IDP camp or live there now point out that

“Now a fence has been set up around it [IDP camp in Kamianske]. They [IDPs] have no friendship with the locals. [...] In Dnipro, before arriving at the IDP camp [in Kamianske], I was shocked that the locals made a fuss of us” (IDP4);

“Majority [of the locals] dealt with the displaced people peacefully” (IDP5);

“Nobody treats me badly. Some say that the displaced people have become insolent. In my case, I don’t feel any [dislike]. [...] And now it’s more calm. The media are working. Even if someone did not understand, who the displaced persons are, they now understand” (IDP6).
Summing up, female IDPs were faster to adapt to new geopolitical and life realities related to the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict than male IDPs in such aspects as finding a job, making new social ties, and recovering quickly from the psychological consequences of the military crisis. Thus, female IDPs (especially in married couples) integrate more rapidly and more fully into host urban communities than male IDPs. As a rule, female IDPs, faced with the difficulties associated with forced displacement, are looking for new opportunities and to solve them. On the contrary, male IDPs are stuck in their past stage of life – before the military crisis, when they had stable jobs and housing, long-term family, friendship, professional and other social ties, and were the main breadwinners of the family – and for a long time cannot find their place in the new host community. There were no striking differences in adaptation to new realities and the integration of IDPs into local communities based on age and educational levels, because most of the participants at the time of the study were of working age with higher education (see Appendix 1). Obviously, more detailed, and broader research is needed to identify the impact of these IDP characteristics. The only thing we can assume is that IDPs with high skills find jobs in the highly differentiated and flexible labour markets of large cities more quickly than IDPs with low and narrowly specialised skills (perhaps because of the industrial specialisation of Donbas).

### 4.3.2 The spatial distribution of IDPs in selected major cities: IDP housing and mobility

An analysis of the interview materials and the empirical results described above indicate that the spatial distribution of IDPs shows several features. Firstly, when IDPs with good economic opportunities come to a major city, they tend to look primarily for districts with their ‘normal’ residential environment, with a special focus on the district’s infrastructure provision. Secondly, when IDPs with poor economic situation come to a major city, they look for budget housing (or, as one informant said: “least a little bit of living conditions” (IDP8)), close to work, but then gradually improve their housing conditions. IDPs with a poor economic situation are mainly concentrated on the periphery of major cities or in the budget housing segment of other city’s parts. Thirdly, one of the budget housing options for IDPs is an IDP camp, but it is very difficult to get there due to the long queue, but some IDPs deliberately refuse to live in IDP camps through poor living conditions or other individual reasons. Moreover, informants who live or have lived in IDP camps report that certain elements of IDP marginalisation are observed in these camps. Confirmation of this can be found in such comments of IDPs:

“A few families are normal. Mostly drunkards. Some people told that in Donetsk Oblast earned 10 thousand [Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH)], and here we earned 3 thousand [UAH] as loaders in ATB [supermarket]. Refused to work. Continued to drink” (IDP4);

“Our IDP camp is prestigious. There are local showdowns. But mostly [residents] are normal. There was one, she was jailed” (IDP5);

“Someone has died from an overdose. We have a separate block for 4 families. All our families are not bad. […] Prosperous families. But there in the dorms. Around 10%. Former neighbour, she is now in prison” (IDP6)."

Lastly there is no distinct enclavisation of IDPs or ghettoisation in poor districts of the studied cities. When the informants described the spatial distribution of IDPs within the selected major cities, they noted the following: in Dnipro – “Dnipros highway. From the side of Dnepro. And housing estates are relatively cheaper than any housing on the right bank [of the Dni pro River]. Most are here or on the right bank – Petrovsky Avenue [Novokodatskyi District]” (IDP2); “scattered throughout the city” (IDP4); “There are [IDPs] living in the suburbs. Found housing in the suburbs. Probably, [IDPs] are everywhere in the city” (IDP5); in Kharkiv – “Mainly [IDPs live] on the outskirts, of course” (IDP8); and in Odessa – “The displaced people are “smeared with a thin layer” (over the city)” (IDP3).

According to the participants, the most common barrier to the successful integration of IDPs into host urban communities is the lack of their own or stable housing. Most informants live in rented housing, a minority either in IDP camps or in their own housing. Based on the above results and a literature review of Ukrainian IDP studies, we can say that the case of Ukraine differs qualitatively and quantitatively from the case of other post-Soviet countries with ‘frozen’ conflicts. For example, in Ukraine there is no mass construction of ‘mushroom villages’ near large cities, as was the case in Georgia near Tbilisi (Tserovani settlement and others) in 2008, or as before in the same Georgia, the Shevardnadze regime cynically kept forced internally displaced persons (because of wars in the 1990s) in poverty to profit from their plight through the finances of international aid (see more in Bruckner, 2009, pp. 172–173; Kabachnik et al., 2015; Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009). The salient features of ‘mushroom villages’ are firstly: poor quality of structures due to the accelerated pace of mass construction; secondly, the lack of employment opportunities; thirdly, isolation from basic services, towns and infrastructure; and finally, lots of these settlements are spatially isolated (Kabachnik et al., 2014, p. 9). A parallel situation with newly constructed settlements for IDPs is observed in Azerbaijan, as the spatial and social isolation in these settlements is dictated by the remoteness of the settlements from the regional centres, cities and towns populated by non-IDPs, thus weakening ties and interactions between IDPs and non-IDPs (Gureyeva-Alieva and Huseynov, 2011, p. 43).

Also, for example, comparing the experience of Georgia and Ukraine, it should be noted that in the urban dimension of Ukraine there is no significant socio-spatial isolation of IDPs, as can be seen in the urban dimension of Georgia (see more in Gogishvili, 2015; Gogishvili and Harris-Brandts, 2019; Salukvadze et al., 2014), and Ukrainian IDPs are largely scattered across the city among urban residents and districts. Simultaneously, the urban dimension of internal displacement of both Ukrainian and Georgian IDPs is characterised by a concentration in the respective country’s major cities: namely for Ukraine – in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Lviv, and other large cities; and for Georgia – in Tbilisi and the other major cities: Zugdidi (the closest to the Abkhazian territory), Kutaisi, and Gori (close to the administrative boundary line with South Ossetia) (Elizbarashvili et al., 2020; Luciani, 2018; Mitchneck et al., 2009).

Hence, based on the quantitative and qualitative empirical results, it can be argued that the spatial isolation of IDPs within major Ukrainian cities is weak, which refutes the previously stated Hypothesis 3 (segregation effect). Nevertheless, the spatial distribution of urban IDPs needs to be understood with caution, as there is some fragmentation. Although most IDPs live in comfortable city districts, notwithstanding, they can localise/concentrate...
in low-cost housing segments of these districts, which are usually on the outskirts of comfortable districts and have poorer housing conditions, but these conditions are not always poorer than for the ordinary citizens in these parts of the city. In other words, in major Ukrainian cities, there is no “enclavisation/islandisation” of internally displaced persons, but rather a certain intra-district ‘outsurkisation’ of urban IDPs. This is not related to the status of IDPs, however, but simply reflects the usual realities of most internal economic migrants in Ukrainian urban areas, due to the spatial heterogeneity of price proposals in the housing markets of large cities.

As evidenced by the materials of the in-depth interviews, the majority of urban IDPs plan to continue to live in the cities of their current residence, even after the end of the armed conflict. Such a situation requires from the government of Ukraine and the authorities of host communities not short-term, but long-term solutions to the urgent problems of urban IDPs: in particular social housing and adequate housing conditions, social protection, etc.

Summarising the interview materials, we can identify several possible general behavioural strategies of urban IDPs:

1. Behavioural strategy: ‘ordinary citizen’ – a strategy of further rooting in the host community urban IDPs who perceive the city of their current residence as their home and do not want to return to NGCAs even if peace arrives in the conflict zone. This strategy consists of the following two types (sub-strategies). Type 1, ‘local ordinary citizen’, is characteristic of IDPs who already consider the current city as their home and do not want to leave it even after the end of the conflict, in addition, they have stable housing or their own housing. Type 2, ‘relative ordinary citizen’, includes those IDPs who plan to stay in the current city even after the end of the conflict and perceive it completely/mainly as their city/home, but cannot yet afford adequate stable housing. The strategy ‘ordinary citizen’ can be called long-term, given that, under the optimistic scenario, IDPs from the type 2 (‘relative ordinary citizen’) will gradually move to the type 1 (‘local ordinary citizen’). An example of Type 1 is a participant from Kharkiv:

“I say that the home is Kharkiv. My home is where my family is. My daughter grew up here. I am not going to return there [NGCA]. Even if the situation returns to its normal course. […] I like Kharkiv… I see my family only in Kharkiv. To live and build the future. We have been here for 6 years – the foundation has been laid” (IDP1).

An example of Type 2 is an IDP from Dnipro:

“Our house was dismantled there [NGCA]. There is nowhere to return. […] Even if Donbas will flourish, it will take 20–30 years. Even if the war is over, I do not want to waste time on it. […] I was happy when I became an entrepreneur and pay taxes. I was glad that as a full-fledged citizen I pay [taxes], and honestly, I would have housing… […] I fell in love with Dnipro, this is my big city” (IDP5);

2. Behavioural strategy: ‘transit’ IDP – a strategy of the further search for more favourable living conditions for IDPs in or near other Ukrainian large cities and an unwillingness to return to the conflict zone, even if the conflict ends, as well as complete/partial unwillingness to integrate into the host community. In particular this strategy can be of two types. Type 3, ‘capable transit’ IDPs, unites those IDPs who have a good economic situation and opportunities for displacement to a new large city or its suburb in the short-term perspective. Type 4, ‘trapped transit’ IDPs, is typical for those IDPs who would like to leave their current city and displacement to another large city or its suburb, but such displacement is not possible due to a poor economic situation, thus there is a postponement of displacement for the period of accumulation of necessary financial resources for its realisation. An example of Type 3 is a participant from Donbas:

“There is no desire to return there [Donbas]. I cannot imagine if I stayed. It has been like this for 7 years. I would like to decide for yourself – where is our place, where to stay. […] The most attractive [for displacement] is the suburb of Kyiv. If there will be a vacancy. I am considering Kyiv. […] There is a house [in Donbas] that I built myself. If transferred to the territory of Ukraine (GCA), I would be happy. […] Home is my heart. A place where not only physically, but also mentally” (IDP2).

An example of Type 4 is an IDP from the Crimea:

“There [Kamianske (ex-Dniprodzerzhynsk)] are big problems with unemployment. Not just for the displaced people. […] I dream of leaving here. But there is no money, no specific goal. I can find a job by my profession. […] Considering that the child will soon graduate from school, this is a big city. The worst option is Odessa. In order of priority – Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk [now Dnipro], Lviv, Kyiv. Kyiv is in the first place. Also Ternopil. There are universities there. […] I am here almost assimilated. But I don’t consider myself a Dniprodzerzhynets” (IDP4);

3. Behavioural strategy: ‘ambivalent’ IDP: a strategy that assumes that IDPs are in a state of uncertainty about further displacement and integration in the host community. Similar to previous strategies, this strategy has two types. Type 5, ‘ambivalent’ IDPs with negative skew, is characteristic of IDPs that are sufficiently or partially integrated into the host communities, but in case of deterioration of their socio-economic situation, intend to return to NGCAs. Type 6, ‘ambivalent’ IDPs with positive skew, includes IDPs who are sufficiently/partially integrated into the host community but would like to return to their former places of residence in NGCAs after the end of the armed conflict. An example of Type 5 is an IDP from Donetsk:

“If I had housing, I would say, I’m from the Dnipro. But we live in limbo. We may be expelled [from the IDP camp], and we will have to go to Donetsk. Even if I say in the summer, leave [the IDP camp], I will not be able to pay 7–10 thousand [UAH] for [renting] a room. I will not have a choice. I shall have to go to Donetsk to my apartment” (IDP6).

An example of Type 6 is a participant from Luhansk:

“I would like [to return to Donbas]. If everything returned as it was before [2014]. Judging by what is happening, I do not expect anything good. They [people in NGCA] consider us [IDPs in GCA] traitors. We did not defend our land. Those who stayed believe that we took out their intellectual potential, abandoned them with nothing. […] Probably, even before Kharkiv, [home] was definitely Luhansk. Now it is not 100%, but more Kharkiv. Fifty-fifty. […] I would love to go [to Donbas], especially if there was peace. So that [people] perceive us as peacekeepers, and not invaders, as it is now. Life there stopped in 2014
and is degrading. I would take part in the restoration of (Donbas)” (IDP8).

The most socially vulnerable categories of IDPs usually have the 4th or 5th behavioural sub-strategies. Regarding the 4th sub-strategy, an important element of further internal displacement and successful integration into the host community is an essential improvement in the economic situation. The deplorable situation is further aggravated by the fact that ‘trapped transit’ IDPs’ property could have been confiscated by illegal military formations in NGCAs; consequently, they can no longer sell their property and thereby improve their financial situation. The 5th behavioural sub-strategy is usually inherent in IDPs who cannot find adequate housing in GCAs, but they still have housing in NGCAs, to which they can return at any time, if it is not confiscated by the occupation armed groups.

5. Conclusions

This paper expands the understanding of the IDPs’ accommodation in large cities and describes several reasons why IDPs choose large cities as the destination of internal displacement. Additionally, the study indicates that the late implementation of the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” (UN, 1998), which sets out the principles relevant to the protection of IDPs in all phases of displacement, and institutional chaos in the country can, on the one hand, exacerbate the socio-economic situation of IDPs and lead to marginalisation. On the other hand, it can narrow the opportunities for adequate adaptation to new geopolitical realities and successful integration into host communities and society. The hidden urban geographies of internal displacement consist of several problems: ignoring the needs (not only humanitarian) of urban IDPs which they face every day (e.g. stigmatisation, inequality in the rights of non-IDPs and IDPs, discrimination in the labour and housing markets, poor socio-economic situation and unstable housing, etc.); and in the case of conflict-induced IDPs, some are forced, at their own risk, to return to the conflict zone to meet their basic needs, as their basic needs have been ignored in government-controlled areas.

The results of the author’s in-depth interviews, combined with the above-mentioned empirical results, shed light on patterns of the IDPs’ adaptation and integration in large Ukrainian cities and help to understand more deeply the hidden urban geographies of internal displacement in large cities. The results of the statistical analysis indicated that in the major Ukrainian cities, most IDPs live in urban districts with comfortable residential conditions in terms of basic urban infrastructure, security, and cleanliness; however, only IDP households with lower-middle- and upper-incomes can afford to live in such districts. The minority of urban IDPs live in urban districts with uncomfortable or poor comfortable residential conditions in terms of the characteristics listed above, where most of these IDPs have low household incomes. As an exception, a critical minority of urban IDPs live in the luxurious central city district of Kyiv, where housing prices are the most expensive in the capital, but, simultaneously, the district has a second-rate comfortable residential environment.

The interviews in selected major cities of Ukraine pointed to the lack of spatial enclaves in the intra-urban distribution of IDPs, excluding individual IDP camps and other collective centres, even though the residents of such collective centres are less numerous compared to the total number of IDPs throughout the city. There are no enclaves of forced displacement people in its traditional sense or as observed in large cities of other the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries with ‘frozen’ conflicts (Georgia, Azerbaijan); in comparison, there is a soft islanisation of IDPs among Ukrainian large cities in IDP camps and other collective centres (e.g. Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, etc.). Nevertheless, in the major Ukrainian cities, the process of intra-district ‘outskirtisation’ of urban IDPs is observed with further gradual improvement of living conditions, but the COVID-19 pandemic has slowed down these positive changes.

Importantly, a further research area may be to study the socio-economic situation of Crimea IDPs, as, on the one hand, most studies have related to either the general situation of Ukrainian IDPs, or focused on IDPs from Donbas. On the other hand, we need an understanding of the current situation of IDPs from Crimea, as Crimean IDPs, according to Austin Charron (2020), are “Overshadowed by their far more numerous counterparts from Donbas”, especially Crimean Tatars as one of the most socially vulnerable and discriminated groups among Ukrainian IDPs (UNHCR, 2019). Also, further studies should be concerned with the IDP-Roma and IDPs living in IDP camps. In addition, studies of Ukrainian IDPs in major cities need to deepen the analysis in each city and understand in more detail the situation of IDPs on issues such as sense of home and “double” displacement (e.g. Kabachnik et al., 2010), the experience of secondary and multiple displacements, etc.

Besides, since 2014, Ukraine has been reforming the decentralisation of local self-government and the territorial organisation of authority. As part of this reform, a good institutional environment is being formed at the local level for the rapid (non-centralised) realisation of various local initiatives by both the authority and the community. This is a very important step for Ukraine and its citizens, as local authorities have new opportunities to solve problems and improve the integration of Ukrainian IDPs into host communities. Therefore, one of the promising areas of research on Ukrainian IDPs at the local level may be a study of successful practices of support and integration of IDPs into different host communities.

Finally, the government and local authorities need to decide what to do with the morally and physically obsolete IDP camps where IDPs still live, as the lifetime of these camps expired in 2018. It is important to ensure that prudence exists in solving the IDPs’ housing problems in Ukraine, so that policymakers do not (re-)adopt the experience of the mass construction of spatially and socially isolated ‘mushroom villages’ on the outskirts of cities or urban areas and remote from urban centres for the majority of non-IDPs (e.g. Azerbaijan and Georgia), because this will exacerbate the already fragile social and economic integration of IDPs. Although such actions nominally solve the housing issue for IDPs, they will have negative consequences for the IDPs’ living conditions. This results from the construction of new isolated settlements/IDP camps which is not a long-term solution to the problem, but rather a trigger for new displacements within the city or to other urban areas, which ultimately creating a downward spiral of insecurity, informality, and vulnerability. Moreover, a differentiated approach to IDP assistance should be implemented, given the above-identified types of IDP behavioural sub-strategies (although there may be many more) that will create flexibility in the gradual process of successful IDP integration into urban host communities.
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References:


Please cite this article as:

Appendices

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Appendix 1: Characteristics of IDP-informants who participated in in-depth interviews

Source: author’s elaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Index of IDP localisation</th>
<th>The level of residential environment comfort</th>
<th>Index of IDP concentration</th>
<th>Average annual cost of housing (the cost of apartments)</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Type 1: urban districts with conspicuous localisation of IDPs
| Subtype 1.1 | AAA | A | A | A |
|            | AAA(A) | A | A | (A) |
|            | (A)AAA | (A) | A | A |
| Subtype 1.2 | AAAC | A | A | C |
|            | (A)AAB | (A) | A | B |
| Type 2: urban districts with ‘moderate’ localisation of IDPs
| Subtype 2.1 | BA/B | B | A | (A) |
|             | BBBB | B | B | B |
| Subtype 2.2 | BBBC | B | B | C |
| Type 3: urban districts with ‘tangible presence’ of IDPs
| Subtype 3.1 | CCCB | C | C | B |
| Subtype 3.2 | CCDD | C | C | D |
| Type 4: urban district with a high dispersion of IDPs | DBDA | D | B | D | A |

Description of encoded values:
- A = very high level:
  - IL > 1.300
  - RE > 1.000
  - IC > 1.100
  - IHP > 1.200
- (A) = high level:
  - 1.100 < IL ≤ 1.300
  - 0.975 < RE ≤ 1.000
  - 1.000 < IC ≤ 1.100
  - 1.115 < IHP ≤ 1.200
- B = medium level:
  - 0.850 < IL ≤ 1.100
  - RE ≤ 0.975
  - 0.900 < IC ≤ 1.000
  - 0.915 < IHP ≤ 1.115
- C = low level:
  - 0.600 < IL ≤ 0.850
  - RE ≤ 0.750
  - 0.750 < IC ≤ 0.900
  - 0.800 < IHP ≤ 0.915
- D = very low level:
  - IL ≤ 0.600
  - IC ≤ 0.750
  - IHP ≤ 0.800

Appendix 3: Description of nine clusters of major Ukrainian cities’ districts

Note: Variables: (IL) Index of IDP localisation and Normalised indicators; (RE) The level of residential environment comfort in urban districts (OLX survey in January 2019); (IC) Index of IDP concentration (number of IDPs per 1,000 urban residents); (IHP) Average annual cost of housing – the cost of apartments – in urban districts (USD/m2, 2018)

Source: author’s elaboration
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics: indicators of IDP distribution and key characteristics of the urban district residential environments of the major Ukrainian cities

Notes: Variables: (1) Registered number of IDPs (persons, as of June 13, 2019); (2) The level of residential environment comfort in urban districts (OLX survey in January 2019); (3) Average annual population in urban districts (persons, 2018); (4) Index of IDP concentration (number of IDPs per 1,000 urban residents); (5) Share of registered number of IDPs (%), as of June 13, 2019; (6) Index of IDP localisation; (7) Average annual cost of housing – the cost of apartments – in urban districts (USD/m2, 2018)

Source: author’s elaboration